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FOREWORD
NEAL DEVINS*
The origins of this symposium date back to 1982, the year I graduated from
law school.  While working (for Vanderbilt University’s Institute for Public
Policy Studies) on a project concerning religious liberty and private education,
an epic policy blunder by the Reagan Administration piqued my interest in
government lawyers.  By claiming that “as a matter of law” racist schools were
entitled to tax breaks, the Administration was slammed by the press, the Con-
gress, and, ultimately, the Supreme Court for listening to its lawyers.1  In
studying this controversy, an off-hand comment by Michael Deaver, Reagan’s
Deputy Chief of Staff, transformed my life.  For Deaver,
One of the reasons we got into this mess was that the only people Ronald Reagan had
talked to about the issue were lawyers.  So far as [he was] concerned, lawyers are not
real ‘people,’ they live in their own world. . . .  [T]he human and perceptual side of
this was not considered and wouldn’t be by the lawyers.
2
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* Ernest W. Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College of William and
Mary.  This symposium would not be possible without Theresa Newman, General Editor of Law and
Contemporary Problems.  Theresa, after foolhardily suggesting that I put together a symposium for
L&CP, worked with me for more than a year in putting this issue together.  Her professionalism, kind-
ness, and friendship were integral to this project.  Thanks are also owed to Don Horowitz, who helped
shape the symposium, and Jeff Lubbers, who as research director of the Administrative Conference of
the United States, played an instrumental role in my thinking on this subject.
1. For the Court’s reaction, see Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).  For
Congress’s reaction, see Administration’s Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of Ra-
cially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th
Cong. (1982).
2. DAVID WHITMAN, RONALD REAGAN AND TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR RACIST SCHOOLS 86
(1984) (Kennedy School of Government, Case No. C15-84-609.0).  During Independent Counsel Ken-
neth Starr’s investigation of President Bill Clinton, the President’s political advisers were equally con-
temptuous of his lawyers.  In particular, by encouraging the President both to resist Starr’s investiga-
tion and to decline comment to the nation, the President’s lawyers were accused of weakening the
President’s ability to lead the nation.
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Deaver’s comment struck home.  I intended to work for the government and
had taken for granted that my three years in law school would be “value
added” to the policymaking enterprise.
Two years later, I started work at the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and the
unique status of government lawyers became part and parcel of every working
day.  My job, Assistant General Counsel, was to serve as a bridge between ca-
reerist attorneys and political appointees.  In large part, that meant telling ca-
reerist attorneysmost of whom opposed the goals of the Reagan Administra-
tionto toe the agency line.  Consequently, when careerists sought to
undermine official agency views (by invoking their duty either to the law or the
public interest), I suggested that their duty was to do the agency’s bidding (until
they could find a new job).3
Beyond these intramural matters, I occasionally wound up in the midst of
disputes involving other executive branch agencies as well as the Congress.
Most striking, in responding to accusations of agency malfeasance by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office and congressional overseers, I found myself asking the
question that careerists asked of me, that is, for whom do I workthe agency,
the public, or “the law”?  Less problematic (for me) but equally telling, in pre-
paring an assessment of federal civil rights enforcement, I witnessed a bitter
fight between Clarence Thomas, chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), and Brad Reynolds, head of Justice’s Civil Rights Di-
vision.  Justice, in an effort to squelch the EEOC’s sometimes support of af-
firmative action, called upon the White House to pressure the Commission into
withdrawing a brief it filed in support of race preferences.4
When I left the government for law teaching, I could not shake these expe-
riences.  My scholarship was animated by questions of the government lawyer’s
role in shaping public policy, the need for policy cohesion within the Executive
Branch, the consequential nature of who speaks the government’s voice in
court, the competing visions of careerists and political appointees, and, ulti-
mately, the identification of the government lawyer’s client.  In pursuing these
matters, my limited experience as a government lawyer (three years) served as
the lens through which I examined these questions.
My experiences are hardly unique.  Thanks to the (now defunct) Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States, which asked me to prepare a report on
the appropriate division of litigation authority among federal agencies, I have
had the good fortune to speak with government lawyers about their experi-
ences.  Through these conversations as well as other research, I was struck by
the contextual nature of government lawyers’ perspectives on both the sensi-
                                                          
3. Mike Paulsen’s recounting of his struggle over whether to make use of insider information to
sabotage David Souter’s Supreme Court nomination nicely illustrates the difficulties government law-
yers face when their client’s preferences are at odds with their personal moral compasses.  See Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Hell, Handbaskets, and Government Lawyers: The Duty of Loyalty and Its Limits, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Winter 1998).
4. I detail this fight in Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an In-
dependent Agency Independent, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273 (1993).
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bility of the current arrangement and the larger question of what it means to be
a government lawyer.  As a result, I thought it would be fruitful to organize a
symposium which, among other things, brought together lawyers (careerists as
well as political appointees) who worked in different parts of the government.5
This kaleidoscope approach, of course, would reveal the diversity of tasks asso-
ciated with government lawyering as well as the large role that personal experi-
ence plays in defining attitudes toward government lawyering.  More funda-
mentally, a symposium that brought together lawyers from different parts and
levels of government would increase awareness of the extraordinary impor-
tance and complexity of legal policymaking.6
After reading the essays in this volume, one cannot escape the obvious, that
is, when it comes to government lawyering, “where you stand is where you sit.”
For example, nearly every contributor sings the praises of the skills they and
their coworkers brought to bear on legal policymaking.7  More telling, location
figures prominently in the conclusions reached by nearly all contributors.  Law-
yers on Capitol Hill, for example, have a much harder time identifying who
their client is than, say, attorneys in the Office of Legal Counsel.8  In large part,
this difficulty is inevitable because Congress, in many respects, is little more
than an amalgamation of individual members with individual, not institutional,
interests.9  Correspondingly, White House lawyers are far more apt to embrace
the hierarchical unitary executive than their counterparts in decentralized Of-
fices of General Counsel.10  Likewise, Justice Department litigators understand
                                                          
5. While nearly every contributor to this symposium has worked as a government lawyer, some
contributors were invited because of their scholarship on lawyering.
6. With that said, the contributors to this symposium are hardly a random cross-section of gov-
ernment lawyers.  With one exception, all contributors are academics.  Moreover, most contributors
have previously written about some aspect of government lawyering.
7. The most vivid example of this is Mike Young’s insightful tribute to the State Department’s
Office of Legal Adviser.  See Michael K. Young, The Role of the Attorney-Adviser in the U.S. Depart-
ment of State: Institutional Arrangements and Structural Imperatives, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133
(Spring 1998).
8. For Kathleen Clark, committee counsel work for whomever hires themthe ranking majority
or minority member.  See Kathleen Clark, The Ethics of Representing Elected Representatives, 61 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 31 (Spring 1998).  For Mike Glennon, however, the client varies depending on
the issue, the attorney’s instincts, and a range of other factors.  See Michael J. Glennon, Who’s the Cli-
ent?  Legislative Lawyering Through the Rear-View Mirror, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21 (Spring
1998).  In sharp contrast, John Yoo suggests there are broader institutional interests that define much
of the committee lawyer’s work.  See John C. Yoo, Lawyers in Congress, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1 (Spring 1998).
9. Charles Tiefer, who worked at both the House and Senate counsel’s offices, explains this
problem in his essay on lawyering for Congress as an institution.  See Charles Tiefer, The Senate and
House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing in Court the Institutional Congressional Client, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (Spring 1998).
10. Peter Strauss, who served as general counsel to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, sees
agencies and departments as somewhat distinct enterprises that need to coordinate with each other.
See Peter L. Strauss, The Internal Relations of Government: Cautionary Tales from Inside the Black
Box, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155 (Spring 1998).  On the other hand, Steve Calabresi, who spent
some time at the White House, embraces the unitary executive model.  At the same time, recognizing
that absolutism can prove a political nightmare, Professor Calabresi advances a nuanced strategy for
the appointment of government lawyers that is most likely to advance presidential objectives.  See Ste-
ven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution: A Brief Positive Account of
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the benefits of centralized litigation authority in ways that escape agency attor-
neys.11  For their part, agency heads are more apt to prefer policymaking
through notice and comment rulemaking than the trial lawyers who work under
them.12  Lawyers who work in policy shops are similarly troubled by the failure
of enforcement lawyers to make use of cost-benefit analysis.13  Finally (for this
symposium), careerist attorneys put more stock in lessons learned over time
than their political supervisors.14
In addition to differences based on location, political context also figures
prominently in the competing views of government attorneys.  Senate Judiciary
Committee staffers who worked on the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings
or attorneys who worked on the Iran-Contra Independent Counsel investiga-
tion, for example, cannot help but have those events shape their understanding
the Role of Government Lawyers in the Development of Constitutional Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 61 (Winter 1998).
11. Nick Zeppos, for example, defends the Justice Department’s near monopoly on litigation
authority because DOJ has more incentive to create a pool of goodwill and credibility with the courts
than do agency’s with independent litigation authority.  See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Resource Shortfalls in
Government Litigation: Externalizing Costs and Searching for Subsidies, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
171 (Spirng 1998).  In some ways, this assessment is shared by Judge Patricia Wald.  Noting that she
expects more from government lawyers than private counsel, Judge Wald suggests that government
lawyers need to create the type of goodwill and credibility that Zeppos claims is maximized through
the centralization of litigation authority.  See Patricia M. Wald, “For the United States”: Government
Lawyers in Court, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (Winter 1998).  Michael Herz and I offer another
explanation for DOJ control of litigation, namely, the White House cares a great deal about enhancing
hierarchical control over policymaking through centralized DOJ control.  In contrast, Congress sees
little gain in decentralizing litigation authority.  See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That
Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
205 (Winter 1998).
12. Roberta Karmel makes this point in discussing her experiences at the Securities and Exchange
Commission.  In particular, unlike commissioners (like herself) who had incentive to take a broad look
at the costs and benefits of various policy option, trial lawyers saw little gain in making policy outside
of adversarial litigation.  See Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion: The Lawyer as Prosecutor, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (Winter 1998).  For a somewhat
competing view, that is, that lawyers are generally risk adverse, see Jonathan R. Macey, Lawyers in
Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and Process, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (Spring 1998).
13. For example, Peter Schuck, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, makes a strong case for law schools to teach cost-benefit analysis in a
more systematic way.  Pointing to the tunnel vision of most government lawyers, Schuck feels that law-
yers cannot effectively communicate with policy analysts.  See Peter H. Schuck, Lawyers and Policy-
makers in Government, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Winter 1998).  In a related vein, Jon Macey
notes that lawyers bring different skills and instincts to the table than, say, economists, and conse-
quently the substance of government policy will be affected by the mix of lawyers and nonlawyers
within an agency.  See Macey, supra note 12, at 113.
14. David Strauss and Tom Merrill both make this point in discussing their experiences at the So-
licitor General’s office.  Strauss, who makes the point indirectly, argues that the Solicitor General’s
office must guard against appearing too partisan.  Otherwise, the Supreme Court will treat the Solici-
tor General as no different than private counsel and, accordingly, defer less to it.  See David A.
Strauss, The Solicitor General and the Interests of the United States, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165
(Winter 1998).  Merrill likewise believes that a reputation for good faith and honesty is critical to the
Solicitor General’s office.  But for this to occur, as Merrill forcefully argues, senior careerists must play
an instrumental role in defining Solicitor General advocacy.  See Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level,
“Tenured” Lawyers, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Spring 1998).
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of government lawyering.15  More consequential, agency structure and person-
nel often define the quality of life for government attorneys and, with it,
broader perceptions of the enterprise of government lawyering.16  Correspond-
ingly, government lawyering operates in the shadow of both internal (created
by agency heads) and external (created by Congress) incentive schemes.  Crit-
ics of politically ambitious U.S. Attorneys, ideologically-driven “private attor-
neys general,” and monomaniacal Independent Counsels, for example, argue
that the single issue focus of these offices contributes to overzealous prosecu-
tion.17
What is most striking here is that government lawyering is so contextual
that foundational questions remain up for grabs.  Of particular interest, there is
little common ground on the identification of the government lawyer’s client.18
In the end, this symposium, rather than serving up absolute truths, underscores
the varied nature and importance of government lawyering.
                                                          
15. Kathleen Clark, who argues that committee counsel work for the member who hired them and
not the committee, was weaned in the Thomas-Hill hearings.  See Clark, supra note 8.  Bill Treanor,
who explains why court-appointed Independent Counsel are limited in ways that special prosecutors
named by the Attorney General are not, worked for Lawrence Walsh, the Iran-Contra Independent
Counsel.  See William Michael Treanor, Independent Counsel and Effective Investigation, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 149 (Winter 1998).
16. Mike Young, who worked at the State Department, and Tom McGarity, who worked at EPA,
highlight the ways in which internal office dynamics affect the work product and outlook of govern-
ment attorneys.  See Young, supra note 7; Thomas O. McGarity, The Role of Government Attorneys in
Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (Winter 1998).
17. Dan Kahan considers U.S. Attorneys and recommends that Chevron-deference be accorded
DOJ, not U.S. Attorney, interpretations of federal criminal law.  See Dan M. Kahan, Reallocating In-
terpretive Criminal-Lawmaking Power Within the Executive Branch, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47
(Winter 1998).  Jeremy Rabkin examines private attorneys general and recommends that public law
enforcement be conducted (almost) exclusively by democratically accountable officials.  See Jeremy A.
Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (Winter
1998).  Bill Treanor’s comparison of Attorney General-appointed special prosecutors to court-
appointed Independent Counsels, however, suggests that the absence of a checking mechanism re-
strains Independent Counsel prosecutions.  See Treanor, supra note 15.
18. On this point, one-time Associate White House Counsel Nelson Lund’s explanation of why
political appointees who represent the President operate in a world without ethical rules is particularly
instructive.  See Nelson Lund, The President as Client and the Ethics of the President’s Lawyers, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (Spring 1998); see also Clark, supra note 8 (noting that there are no gov-
erning standards of ethical conduct for Capitol Hill lawyers).  Likewise, H.W. Perry’s examination of
what it means to be a “servant of the law” calls attention to the myriad ways in which United States
Attorneys and other government lawyers can identify their client.  See H.W. Perry, Jr., United States
AttorneysWhom Shall They Serve?, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 (Winter 1998).
